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Abstract 
 
Section 164(3) of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 
(hereafter TAA) provides a senior South African Revenue 
Service official (hereafter, respectively, SARS and senior SARS 
official) with discretionary powers to suspend the payment of 
disputed tax or a portion thereof, having regard to relevant 
factors, if the taxpayer intends to dispute the liability to pay such 
tax. Making a decision in terms of section 164(3) of the TAA 
constitutes administrative action. Section 33(1) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter 
Constitution) grants everyone the right to just administrative 
action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair and the 
Promotion of Administrative Action Act 3 of 2000 (hereafter 
PAJA) was promulgated to give effect to this right. The objective 
of this article is to apply the right to just administrative action to 
the manner in which the decision in terms of section 164(3) of the 
TAA is taken. This is achieved by adopting an explanatory 
research approach and performing a literature review of the 
process in terms of section 164(3) of the TAA and the 
constitutional obligations in terms of section 33 of the 
Constitution as given effect to in PAJA. As the decision taken by 
the senior SARS official is influenced directly by the right to just 
administrative action, it should be taken in a lawful, reasonable 
and procedurally fair manner to ensure compliance with the 
Constitution and PAJA. For the decision to be taken in a lawful 
manner, the senior SARS official must at least be authorised to 
exercise the discretion in terms of the TAA and comply with the 
procedures and conditions stated in section 164(3) of the TAA. 
For the decision to be considered reasonable, the decision must 
be, at the minimum, rational and proportional, and to ensure that 
the decision is taken procedurally fair, SARS should comply with 
at least the relevant compulsory elements in terms of section 
3(2)(b) of PAJA. A decision in terms of section 164(3) of the TAA 
which fails to meet the requirements of lawfulness, 
reasonableness and/or procedural fairness will be subject to 
review on several grounds listed in section 6(2) of PAJA. 
Keywords 
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1 Introduction 
Section 164(1) of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 (hereafter TAA), 
known as the "pay now, argue later" rule,1 in essence provides that the 
obligation to pay tax and the right of the South African Revenue Service 
(hereafter SARS) to receive and recover tax will not be suspended by an 
objection or appeal, unless a senior SARS official otherwise directs in terms 
of section 164(3) of the TAA. In terms of section 164(2) of the TAA, a 
taxpayer can request a senior SARS official to suspend the payment of tax, 
or a portion thereof, due under an assessment, if the taxpayer intends to 
dispute the liability to pay such tax in terms of the TAA (hereafter suspension 
request). Section 164(3) of the TAA then allows a senior SARS official to 
suspend the payment of disputed tax and contains the factors to be 
considered when adjudicating a suspension request. Relevant factors shall 
be considered, including: 
(a) whether the recovery of the disputed tax will be in jeopardy or there will be 
a risk of dissipation of assets;  
(b) the compliance history of the taxpayer with SARS;  
(c) whether fraud is prima facie involved in the origin of the dispute;  
(d) whether payment will result in irreparable hardship to the taxpayer not 
justified by the prejudice to SARS or the fiscus if the disputed tax is not paid 
or recovered; or  
(e) whether the taxpayer has tendered adequate security for the payment of 
the disputed tax and accepting it is in the interest of SARS or the fiscus.2 
Section 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter 
Constitution) states that the Constitution is the supreme law in South Africa, 
and any law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid. As such, all tax 
legislation (such as section 164 of the TAA) and all conduct by SARS (such 
as deciding on a suspension request) must be in compliance with the 
Constitution. The fundamental rights of people (including taxpayers) in 
South Africa, are enshrined and enhanced by the Constitution.3 Section 33 
of the Constitution provides for the right to just administrative action, which 
includes the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair (section 33(1)) and the right to be given written reasons 
when rights have been adversely affected by administrative action (section 
33(2)). Parliament has promulgated the Promotion of Administrative Action 
Act 3 of 2000 (hereafter PAJA) to give effect to section 33 of the 
                                            
  Silke de Lange. MComm (Taxation) (Stellenbosch University). Mercantile Law 
Lecturer, Stellenbosch University. Email: silkeb@sun.ac.za. 
  Danielle van Wyk. CA (SA) MAccounting (Taxation) (Stellenbosch University). 
Financial Accounting Lecturer, Stellenbosch University. Email: dvanwyk@sun.ac.za. 
1  Olivier 2001 SALJ 193. 
2  Section 164(3) of the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 (hereafter the TAA). 
3  Erasmus Commissioner's Discretionary Powers 10. 
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Constitution.4 The rules and principles of administrative procedure are 
defined by PAJA, which aims to promote an efficient administration and 
good governance.5 PAJA furthermore creates a culture of accountability, 
openness and transparency in the public administration or in the exercise 
of a public power or the performance of a public function.6 
As an organ of state, SARS is bound by the obligations and duties inferred 
from the right to just administrative action in section 33 of the Constitution 
and as set out in PAJA.7 The right to just administrative action therefore has 
a direct impact on any administrative actions carried out by SARS, and the 
importance of section 33 and PAJA in the context of tax legislation and the 
conduct of SARS must not be understated. It has been held by our courts 
that a decision by SARS on a suspension request amounts to administrative 
action,8 as contemplated in section 33 of the Constitution and in section 1 
of PAJA. This was found as: 
[I]t has long been accepted that when the Commissioner exercises 
discretionary powers conferred upon him (or her) by statute, the exercise of 
the discretion constitutes administrative action.9 
Section 1 of PAJA defines "administrative action" as: 
… any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by an organ of state, 
when… exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of 
any legislation… which adversely affects the rights of any person and which 
has a direct, external legal effect but does not include … 
                                            
4  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2008 2 SA 24 (CC) para 42 (hereafter the 
Sidumo case). 
5  Preamble of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (hereafter PAJA); 
Kotzé 2004 PELJ 19. 
6  Preamble of PAJA. 
7  In terms of s 2 of the South African Revenue Service Act 34 of 1997 SARS was 
established as an organ of state to advance the efficient and effective collection of 
revenue. The Bill of Rights, which includes the right to just administrative action, 
applies to all organs of state in terms of s 8(1) of the Constitution. 
8  Metcash Trading Ltd v Commissioner for South African Revenue Services 2000 63 
SATC 13 para 42 (hereafter the Metcash case) and Capstone 556 (Pty) Ltd v 
Commissioner for South African Revenue Service 2011 6 SA 65 (WCC) para 11 
(hereafter the Capstone case). The Metcash case dealt with the constitutional 
validity of s 36(1) of the Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991. This latter section was 
similar, in the context of VAT, to the current s 164 of the TAA and provided, in 
essence, that the obligation to pay tax is not suspended by an appeal or pending the 
decision of a court, "unless the Commissioner so directs". In other words, the 
Commissioner had a discretion to suspend the payment of disputed tax, similar to 
the current discretion under s 164(3) of the TAA. It was found that the relevant 
provisions were constitutionally valid. The Capstone case dealt with s 88 of the 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962, which was similar to s 36 of the Value-Added Tax Act 
89 of 1991. 
9  Metcash case para 40. 
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The manner in which the senior SARS official takes a decision in terms of 
section 164(3) of the TAA when deciding on a suspension request should 
therefore comply with the dictates of administrative law. In essence, the 
decision by the senior SARS official must be lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair.  
2 Research objective, methodology and scope  
The objective of this article is to apply the right to just administrative action 
to the manner in which the decision in terms of section 164(3) of the TAA is 
taken. As various academic writers and industry experts have raised valid 
concerns and uncertainties regarding, for example, the application of the 
factors listed in section 164(3),10 such an analysis is submitted to be timely 
and relevant. The research approach adopted to achieve the objective is 
explanatory research, which consists of a literature review of both primary 
and secondary sources. 
The scope of the research is limited, in that it pertains to the South African 
context only. Section 164 of the TAA is considered in respect of the 
suspension to pay disputed income tax only, even though it may also apply 
to other types of taxes such as value-added tax. The right to reasons in 
terms of section 33(2) of the Constitution and section 5 of PAJA is referred 
to where relevant, but a detailed discussion thereof falls beyond the scope 
of this article. This article should in any event not be construed as an 
exhaustive discussion of all the administrative law principles applicable in 
the context of section 164(3) of the TAA. Rather, specific aspects of 
lawfulness, reasonableness and procedural fairness relevant in the context 
of suspension requests and the decision taken by a senior SARS official in 
this regard are selected and applied. If the provisions of PAJA, through the 
definition of administrative action, do not apply to an administrative action 
by SARS, then the constitutional principle of legality could apply.11 However, 
a discussion of legality falls beyond the scope of this article. It should further 
be noted that this article does not consider the constitutionality of any 
legislative provisions, but considers a decision in terms of section 164(3) of 
the TAA only in the light of the right to just administrative action. It will be 
assumed that section 164 of the TAA is constitutionally valid for the 
                                            
10  For a broad list of the concerns and uncertainties, see Van Wyk and Van Zyl 2016 
JEF 564. 
11  Erasmus Commissioner's Discretionary Powers 53. 
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purposes of this article.12 Erasmus13 points out in this regard that the 
provisions authorising administrators to execute an administrative action 
are not necessarily unconstitutional (here the provisions of section 164(3) 
of the TAA), but the application thereof may be (here the decision taken in 
terms of section 164(3) of the TAA, which is investigated in this article).  
Lastly, it is acknowledged that a discussion of constitutional rights would 
generally not be complete without reference to section 36 of the 
Constitution, known as the limitations clause. However, as the application 
of section 36 of the Constitution has not been considered by our courts in 
the context of the right to just administrative action, and as its application 
has been questioned by academic writers,14 such a discussion will not be 
endeavoured in this article. Furthermore, as this article attempts to provide 
guidance on how the discretion of the senior SARS official should be 
exercised to comply with the right to just administrative action as given effect 
to in PAJA, i.e. to avoid the limitation of rights, section 36 of the Constitution 
is irrelevant, as it becomes relevant only when constitutional rights are 
limited.  
3 PAJA 
As stated above, PAJA defines "administrative action" in section 1.15 
Section 2 of PAJA allows the Minister to grant certain exemptions of 
administrative actions from certain provisions of PAJA or to grant 
permissions to administrators to vary certain requirements of PAJA. At the 
time this research was undertaken, no such exemptions or permissions in 
respect of SARS had been granted, and PAJA therefore applies to SARS 
as an organ of state and to its decisions which amount to administrative 
actions. 
As it was accepted in the Metcash and Capstone cases that a decision by 
SARS regarding a suspension of payment is an administrative action as 
defined, a detailed discussion thereof is not required. Suffice it to say the 
following in this regard. It is clear that SARS is making a decision (when 
exercising its discretion whether to suspend the payment or not) as an organ 
of state by exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms 
                                            
12  It was held by the Constitutional Court in the Metcash case that s 36(1) of the Value-
Added Tax Act, which was similar to s 164 of the TAA, was constitutionally valid. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that s 164 of the TAA is also 
constitutionally valid as the two sections are similar but not identical. However, it is 
accepted that s 164 of the TAA is constitutionally valid for the purposes of this article. 
13  Erasmus Commissioner's Discretionary Powers 29. 
14  Quinot and Maree 2015 CCR 42. 
15  See para 1 above. This definition is followed by a list of exclusions, none of which 
are relevant to this article. 
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of the TAA. The senior SARS official can decide to accept or deny the 
suspension request. A requirement of "administrative action" is that it should 
adversely affect rights. This seems to indicate that only a decision to deny 
the suspension would be "administrative action" as accepting the 
suspension would not, ordinarily, adversely affect the taxpayer's rights. 
However, all taxpayers have the right to a fair process when a suspension 
request is considered. It has accordingly been confirmed by the 
Constitutional Court that this requirement should be interpreted as 
administrative action that has the capacity to affect legal rights.16 In terms 
of a suspension request, the legal right can be seen as the taxpayer's right 
to have a suspension request fairly considered by a senior SARS official, as 
such a request is provided for in section 164(2) of the TAA.  
As a decision in terms of section 164(3) of the TAA amounts to 
"administrative action" as defined, it must meet the requirements of section 
33 of the Constitution and PAJA. Furthermore, a taxpayer is allowed to 
invoke the review remedies in section 6 of PAJA where needed.17 The 
process regarding a suspension request requires an analysis first (in 
paragraph 4 below) before the requirements of just administrative action can 
be considered and applied thereto (in paragraph 5 below).  
4 The process of a suspension request 
The process of a suspension request can be divided into the following: the 
suspension request being submitted by the taxpayer, the consideration of 
the request and the discretion exercised by the senior SARS official, the 
decision made by the senior SARS official, and the possible reconsideration 
(review and revocation) of the decision by the senior SARS official. Whilst 
the decision made by the senior SARS official is the topic of this article, the 
two steps in the process preceding the decision, namely the request from 
the taxpayer and the exercise of the discretion by the senior SARS official, 
will influence the decision and must accordingly be addressed here as well. 
4.1 The suspension request from the taxpayer  
Section 164(2) of the TAA allows taxpayers to make a suspension request. 
The suspension of the payment of disputed tax is not an automatic right, 
and taxpayers must apply for a suspension in the form and manner 
                                            
16  AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer of the 
South African Social Security Agency 2014 1 BCLR 1 (CC) para 60. 
17  Erasmus Commissioner's Discretionary Powers 35. 
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prescribed by SARS.18 As stated above, taxpayers merely have a right to 
have a suspension request fairly considered by a senior SARS official.  
The option to submit such a request is extremely helpful, but the manner 
was not prescribed until April 2015, when SARS updated its website to 
include minor detail on a suspension request.19 According to its website, a 
taxpayer can issue a letter to SARS requesting such a suspension. The 
following information must be provided in this letter: the registered details of 
the taxpayer, all tax reference numbers, reason(s) for the request (for 
example, details of the circumstances which prevent compliance), and any 
supporting documents (referred to as "relevant material") to support the 
request.  
The impact of the lack of further guidance regarding the suspension request 
is explained below in paragraphs 5 and 6. 
4.2 The discretion exercised by the senior SARS official 
The use of the word "may" in section 164(3) of the TAA makes it clear that 
it is a discretionary power given to the senior SARS official to decide 
whether or not to accept a suspension request.20 Discretionary powers are 
characterised by the element of choice that they bestow on the decision-
maker.21 To say that someone may exercise a discretion supposes that 
there is no exclusive legal disposition to the problem.22 The senior SARS 
official accordingly has the freedom to choose to accept or deny the request, 
but that freedom must be exercised in line with section 164(3) of the TAA. 
The discretion must also be exercised in a fair manner.23 Croome states 
that a taxpayer's suspension request may not instantly be dismissed.24 
                                            
18  SARS 2013 http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/OpsDocs/Guides/LAPD-TAdm-
G01%20-%20Short%20Guide%20to%20the%20Tax%20Administration%20Act% 
202011%20-%20External%20Guide.pdf 58 (hereafter Short Guide to the TAA). 
19  SARS 2015 http://www.sars.gov.za/ClientSegments/Businesses/Government 
/Pages/Suspension-of-Payment-and-Waiving-of-Penalties-and-Interest.aspx. 
20  Hoexter and Lyster New Constitutional and Administrative Law 25 on permissive 
statutory language such as "may". S 164(3) provides that a senior SARS official may 
suspend payment of the disputed tax or a portion thereof having regard to relevant 
factors, including the factors listed. 
21  SARS 2014 http://www.iacsa.co.za/m/documents/TAA_New%20Dispute% 
20Resolution%20Guide_ExternalDraft_18%20Aug%202014.pdf 21 (hereafter Draft 
Dispute Resolution Guide). It may be noted that the Draft Guide has since been 
finalised, but the final guide has no similar reference to the meaning of discretionary 
powers. 
22  Draft Dispute Resolution Guide 21. 
23  Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 3 SA 936 (CC) 53, where it was stated that 
"[d]iscretion plays a crucial role in any legal system. It permits abstract and general 
rules to be applied to specific and particular circumstances in a fair manner" (footnote 
omitted). 
24  Croome Taxpayers' Rights 220. 
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Based on the principles of administrative law,25 the senior SARS official 
must properly exercise the discretion by considering all of the relevant 
facts,26 or stated differently, must apply his or her mind to the request under 
consideration. It is therefore essential that all senior SARS officials are 
trained sufficiently to deal with suspension requests in a similar and fair 
manner.  
Exercising the discretion in terms of section 164(3) of the TAA will require 
that the senior SARS official considers the relevant factors, including the 
factors listed. The consideration of the factors is further addressed in 
paragraph 5.1.2 below when analysing how the decision to accept or deny 
the suspension request is made, in the context of lawfulness. 
4.3 The decision made and the possible reconsideration (review and 
revocation) thereof by the senior SARS official 
It is compulsory for the senior SARS official to make a decision.27 Such a 
decision must be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair, as further 
addressed and applied in paragraph 5 below. 
The necessary documents on hand and the reasoning behind the decision 
should be kept by the senior SARS official, as the Constitution (section 
33(2)) and PAJA (section 5) allow taxpayers the right to request reasons for 
the decision taken, and to give written reasons proper documentation 
should be kept. 
SARS states that there is a possible risk that taxpayers could abuse a 
suspension request to delay payment.28 Section 164(5) of the TAA therefore 
provides that the senior SARS official may review and revoke the 
suspension (i.e. the decision) due to this inherent risk. According to this 
section, the senior SARS official may revoke a decision to suspend payment 
in terms of section 164(3) of the TAA with immediate effect, if satisfied that: 
(a) after the lodging of the objection or appeal, the objection or appeal is 
frivolous or vexatious;  
(b) the taxpayer is employing dilatory tactics in conducting the objection or 
appeal;  
(c) on further consideration of the factors referred to in subsection (3), the 
suspension should not have been given; or  
                                            
25  See para 6.1.3 below. 
26  Croome Taxpayers' Rights 220. 
27  Section 6(2)(g) of PAJA provides that a failure to take a decision is a ground for 
review. 
28  SARS 2014 http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/OpsDocs/Guides/LAPD-TAdm-
G05%20-%20Dispute%20Resolution%20Guide%20-%20External%20Guide.pdf 22 
(hereafter Dispute Resolution Guide). 
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(d) there is a material change in any of the factors referred to in subsection 
(3), upon which the decision to suspend the amount involved was based. 
A detailed discussion of the revocation of a decision falls beyond the scope 
of this article. However, it is submitted that section 164(5)(c) of the TAA, 
which relates directly to the initial administrative action of accepting the 
suspension request, is subject to abuse by SARS. Once a decision in terms 
of section 164(3) of the TAA is taken in favour of a taxpayer (i.e. the 
suspension request is accepted), it is submitted that such a decision should 
be able to be regarded as a final decision if the suspension request was 
bona fide (i.e. the objection or appeal is not frivolous or vexatious or no 
dilatory tactics are employed) and if no external circumstances change 
materially.29 In terms of section 164(5)(c) of the TAA, however, SARS is 
allowed to revoke its previous decision merely "on further consideration of 
the factors", which presumes that a proper consideration did not initially take 
place as "the suspension should not have been given". Thus, even though 
a taxpayer may secure a suspension of the payment of disputed tax, SARS 
still has the power to revoke that decision for no reason and even if none of 
the circumstances have changed. It is therefore questionable whether 
section 164(5)(c) of the TAA leaves the taxpayer whose suspension request 
was accepted with a reasonable chance to rely on the suspension, pending 
the finality of the dispute resolution process. Whilst it is generally accepted 
that legislation may provide for the variation or revocation of a decision (as, 
for example, provided for in section 164(5) of the TAA),30 it is stated by 
Hoexter31 that: 
… the demands of the Constitution must be borne in mind: the legislature 
would not be entitled to confer an unlimited or too extensive power of 
revocation, as this would undermine the rule of law. 
It is submitted that SARS should not be allowed to consider the section 
164(3)-factors on a continuous basis if there is no external or new reason 
for a reconsideration, as the taxpayer has a right to regard the decision as 
final. If valid changes to the circumstances occur where it will not be 
considered unfair for SARS to react to such changed circumstances, it is 
still possible for SARS to rely on section 164(5)(d) of the TAA. Considering 
whether section 164(5)(c) of the TAA is constitutionally valid is scope for 
further research to be conducted. 
As the decision made in terms of section 164(3) of the TAA constitutes 
administrative action, the requirements that "administrative action" needs to 
be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair are discussed next. The impact 
                                            
29  See ss 164(5)(a), (b) and (d) of the TAA. 
30  Hoexter Administrative Law 278; Quinot Administrative Justice 127. 
31  Hoexter Administrative Law 278. 
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of these requirements on the decision in terms of section 164(3) of the TAA 
is analysed under each of the requirements. 
5 The right to just administrative action and the impact 
thereof on the decision in terms of section 164(3) of the 
TAA 
The rules applicable to administrative action can be divided into substantive 
just administrative action (i.e. lawfulness and reasonableness) and 
procedural fairness.32  
5.1 Lawful administrative action 
Hoexter33 notes that, at its simplest, lawfulness means that administrators 
must comply with the law and must have lawful authority for their decisions. 
In other words, lawfulness requires that an administrator must be authorised 
by law to make a decision and that the decision must be made in line with 
the authorisation. De Ville34 states that public authorities are allowed to do 
only that which they are empowered to do and the authority which exists 
may not be exceeded. Erasmus35 emphasises that a law must authorise the 
exercise of power (the administrative action). Erasmus' statement is derived 
from the decision by the Constitutional Court in Fedsure Life Assurance 
Limited v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council,36 where 
it was held that: 
[i]t is central to the conception of our constitutional order that the legislature 
and executive in every sphere are constrained by the principle that they may 
exercise no power and perform no function beyond that conferred upon them 
by law.37 
Hoexter38 states that it follows from this decision that SARS, as an organ of 
state, does not have inherent powers to do as it pleases. In Stroud Riley 
and Co Ltd v SIR39 it was noted that the word "may", which is also used in 
section 164(3) of the TAA, is used merely to "confer the authority: and the 
authority must be exercised, if the circumstances are such as to call for its 
exercise". 
                                            
32  Erasmus Commissioner's Discretionary Powers 21. 
33  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 666. 
34  De Ville Judicial Review 90. 
35  Erasmus Commissioner's Discretionary Powers 74.  
36  Fedsure Life Assurance Limited v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council 1999 1 SA 374 (CC). 
37  Fedsure Life Assurance Limited v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council 1999 1 SA 374 (CC) para 58. 
38  Hoexter Administrative Law 255. 
39  Stroud Riley and Co Ltd v SIR 1974 4 SA 534 (E) 540. 
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A senior SARS official is authorised to exercise a discretionary power in 
terms of section 164(3) of the TAA. The senior SARS official is authorised 
to exercise the discretion only after having regarded the relevant factors, 
including the factors listed. It is submitted that section 164(3) of the TAA 
therefore contains at least two requirements related to lawfulness. Firstly, 
only a senior SARS official is authorised to make the decision (i.e. the 
person making the decision must be lawfully authorised), and secondly, the 
decision may be made only after having regard to all the relevant factors. 
These requirements are respectively addressed below under the headings 
"who" and "how" in paragraphs 5.1.1 and 5.1.2. 
5.1.1  Who made the decision to accept or deny the suspension request? 
The powers and duties required by the TAA to be executed by a senior 
SARS official must, in terms of section 6 of the TAA, be executed by either 
the Commissioner, a SARS official who has specific written authority from 
the Commissioner to do so, or a SARS official occupying a post designated 
by the Commissioner in writing for this purpose. Failure by SARS to comply 
with section 6 of the TAA would mean that the decision-maker concerned 
would not have the lawful authority to make the decision in terms of section 
164(3) of the TAA. Kruger40 notes that whether or not the recipient of the 
request will indeed be a senior SARS official will not necessarily be clear 
from the person's designation and therefore this needs to be assumed by 
the taxpayer who is submitting the suspension request. It is argued in 
paragraph 5.3 below, however, that a disclosure of who the decision-maker 
was, as part of the procedural fairness requirement, should include that the 
decision-maker was a designated senior SARS official.  
Section 164(3) of the TAA clearly requires that the suspension request be 
considered by a senior SARS official. It is necessary to establish if this 
power may be delegated by a senior SARS official. In terms of section 6(2) 
of the TAA, read together with section 10 of the TAA, it is envisaged that 
only the Commissioner may delegate powers and duties. Section 6(4) of the 
TAA allows "the execution of a task ancillary to a power or duty" to be 
delegated by a senior SARS official only to a SARS official under the control 
of the senior SARS official. It is submitted that a decision in terms of section 
164(3) of the TAA is not such a "task ancillary to a power or duty", but rather 
an actual power or duty. It is also stated in the Short Guide to the TAA that 
section 164 of the TAA contains powers or functions reserved for senior 
SARS officials.41 Consequently, as a senior SARS official is not allowed to 
delegate powers and duties, the section 164(3)-decision will be unlawfully 
                                            
40  Kruger 2014 BTCLQ 27-29.  
41  Short Guide to the TAA 13. 
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taken if performed by anyone other than a senior SARS official in terms of 
an attempted delegation.  
In the case of unauthorised and therefore unlawful administrative action, the 
decision would be reviewable in terms of section 6(2)(a)(i) or (ii) of PAJA in 
terms of which a court or tribunal has the power to judicially review an 
administrative action if it was taken by an administrator who was not 
authorised to do so by the empowering provision42 (when the decision is 
made by someone other than a senior SARS official) or who acted under a 
delegation of power which was unauthorised by the empowering provision43 
(when a delegation was attempted, as delegation is unauthorised by the 
TAA in this context). 
5.1.2  How was the decision to accept or deny the suspension request 
made? 
Another aspect of lawfulness relates to how the decision was made or 
whether all the required procedures and conditions were met.44 According 
to Erasmus,45 this includes the conditions which SARS must satisfy and 
comply with as stated by the authorising legislation. Appropriate compliance 
with the conditions of section 164(3) of the TAA would include the following: 
ensuring that the request relates to a suspension of the payment of 
"disputed" tax, ensuring that the request is from a "taxpayer" as defined in 
the Income Tax Act 58 of 1962 or the TAA, and ensuring the consideration 
of the relevant factors, including the factors listed.  
Section 164(3) of the TAA requires that the senior SARS official has regard 
to relevant factors, including the factors listed in paragraphs (a) to (e) of 
section 164(3). It is submitted that the factors do not constitute a closed 
list.46 Before the 2014 amendment to section 164(3) of the TAA, the word 
"including" did not appear and it was required that regard should be had to 
the factors listed only. SARS has stated that before the 2014 amendment 
(when the factors arguably seemed to constitute a closed list), the phrasing 
of section 164(3) of the TAA did not limit a senior SARS official to 
considering only the factors provided for, when exercising his or her 
discretion.47 The reason for this statement is SARS's administrative fairness 
obligation, i.e. to take a decision only once all relevant considerations have 
                                            
42  Section 6(2)(a)(i) of PAJA. 
43  Section 6(2)(a)(ii) of PAJA. 
44  Quinot Administrative Justice 135-136. 
45  Erasmus Commissioner's Discretionary Powers 76. 
46  PwC South Africa 2015 http://www.thesait.org.za/news/216884/Tax-Administration-
Laws-Amendment-Bill-B14-of-2014-will-effect-amendments-to-the-TAA-.htm 4. 
47  Draft Dispute Resolution Guide 21. 
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been taken into account.48 This is now clarified in the present version of 
section 164(3) of the TAA, which clearly allows for factors other than those 
listed in paragraphs (a) to (e) to be considered. 
A question regarding the factors and how the decision was made is whether 
SARS is always required to consider at least all the factors listed in 
paragraphs (a) to (e), irrespective of whether they are relevant or not. In 
other words, is it required that the factors listed in paragraphs (a) to (e) must 
be relevant, or does "relevant" apply only to any other factors? For example, 
one of the factors listed is whether fraud is prima facie involved in the origin 
of the dispute (paragraph (c)). Is this a factor to be considered in all 
suspension requests, or only when fraud is involved? Does it count in the 
taxpayer's favour when fraud is not prima facie involved in the origin of the 
dispute (i.e. is it a factor which must be considered even though fraud is not 
relevant)? Or is paragraph (c) not required to be considered as a factor if no 
fraud is involved? The use of the word "including" could be interpreted to 
mean that relevant factors must be considered, including at least all the 
factors listed in paragraphs (a) to (e), whether they are relevant or not. The 
use of the word "or" (instead of "and") between paragraphs (d) and (e) 
seems to indicate, however, that all the factors do not have to be 
considered, but that the factors are rather alternatives from each other, 
depending on their relevance. SARS has stated, however, that the factors 
listed in section 164(3) of the TAA "must" be considered.49 In accordance 
with SARS' own view, it is submitted that the senior SARS official should 
consider at least all of the factors listed in paragraphs (a) to (e) to avoid the 
risk of the section 164(3)-decision falling foul of the lawfulness requirement 
by not meeting the required procedures and conditions of the empowering 
provision. Accordingly, it would, for example, count in the taxpayer's favour 
when fraud is not prima facie involved in the origin of the dispute because 
fraud is a factor which must be considered even though fraud is not relevant 
to the origin of the dispute. 
After having considered the factors in paragraphs (a) to (e), it falls within the 
discretion of the senior SARS official to determine whether any other factors 
should be considered as relevant. As no definition exists for the term 
"relevant" in the TAA, the grounds for review in section 6 of PAJA as also 
referred to in this paragraph 5 could provide a general scheme of the 
broadness of the discretion to be exercised in this regard. For example, the 
factor to be considered should have a sufficiently close and logical (i.e. 
rational) connection to the suspension request and should be considered 
                                            
48  Draft Dispute Resolution Guide 21. 
49  Short Guide to the TAA 58. This comment was made on a previous version of s 
164(3) but which also had the word "or" between the second last and the last factor. 
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with reference to the other factors as a whole.50 Therefore, what is 
considered to be relevant will differ from case to case. This is supported by 
a statement that relevance is a matter of degree.51 
It is important that each suspension request be considered on its own 
merits. Section 164(3) of the TAA contains no specific guidelines on the 
application of the relevant and specified factors to be considered.52 
However, if a senior SARS official decides on a suspension request without 
giving proper consideration to the factors, such conduct could be indicative 
of a failure by the senior SARS official to apply his or her mind properly. A 
decision where the discretion was misguided in this way could fall within, for 
example, section 6(2)(e)(iii) of PAJA, which specifically states that where 
the action was taken because irrelevant considerations were considered or 
relevant considerations were not taken into account, this would be a ground 
for review. Section 6(2)(b) of PAJA, which allows for review if "a mandatory 
and material procedure or condition prescribed by an empowering provision 
was not complied with", can also be used as a ground for review should it 
be shown that the conditions or requirements of section 164(3) of the TAA 
were not complied with. 
5.2 Reasonable administrative action 
Goldswain53 expresses the opinion that reasonableness is the cornerstone 
of the right to just administrative action. In Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism54 Judge O'Regan set out a 
number of factors which can be used to determine if a decision is 
reasonable. These include: 
… the nature of the decision, the identity and expertise of the decision maker, 
the range of factors relevant to the decision, the reasons given for the 
decision, the nature of the competing interest involved and the impact of the 
decision on the lives and well-being of those affected.55 
Erasmus56 indicates that to determine whether or not a decision is 
reasonable, both the rationality and the proportionality of the decision need 
to be determined. Hoexter57 confirms this, and suggests that these two 
                                            
50  Van Wyk Analysis of the Discretion of the SARS 42. 
51  Keane Modern Law of Evidence 20. 
52  Van Wyk and Van Zyl 2016 JEF 562. 
53  Goldswain Winds of Change 237. 
54  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 
4 SA 490 (CC) para 45. 
55  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 
4 SA 490 (CC) para 45. 
56  Erasmus Commissioner's Discretionary Powers 90. 
57  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 670. 
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grounds are theoretically different, because PAJA has separate grounds for 
review for each of them. Rationality and proportionality are subsequently 
considered in the context of a decision in terms of section 164(3) of the TAA. 
5.2.1  Rationality 
The test to determine rationality was first formulated in Carephone (Pty) Ltd 
v Marcus,58 and it was confirmed in the decision of the Sidumo case as 
follows: 
[I]s there a rational objective basis justifying the conclusion made by the 
administrative decision-maker between the material properly available to him 
and the conclusion he or she eventually arrived at?59 
A rational decision therefore means that one must be able to justify the 
decision based on the information known to the administrator and the 
reasons supplied for that decision.60 Routledge61 states that where the 
decision is "so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral 
standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question 
to be decided could have arrived at it", the decision can be challenged on 
the grounds of irrationality. Judge Kriegler stated in the Metcash case that 
the Commissioner (now the senior SARS official) should be able to "justify 
his decision as being rational".62 
A decision will be reviewable in terms of section 6(2)(f)(ii)(aa) to (dd) of 
PAJA if: 
(f)  the action itself – […] 
(ii) is not rationality connected to -  
(aa) the purpose with which it was taken; 
(bb) the purpose of the empowering provision; 
(cc) the information before the administrator; or 
(dd) the reasons given for it by the administrator. 
Section 6(2)(f)(ii)(cc) of PAJA can, for example, be applied in the context of 
a suspension request as follows. Rationality requires, inter alia, that there 
must be a logical connection between the decision and the information on 
which the decision was based. It is submitted that the required information 
to be submitted by taxpayers when making a suspension request is not 
stipulated in sufficient detail by SARS (see paragraph 4.1 above). Although 
                                            
58  Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus 1999 3 SA 304 (LAC). 
59  Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus 1999 3 SA 304 (LAC) para 25. 
60  Hoexter Administrative Law 340. 
61  Routledge Cavendish Constitutional Law 134. 
62  Metcash case para 35. 
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the listed factors in section 164(3) of the TAA are not exhaustive,63 
guidelines for at least the factors listed should be issued to ensure, for 
example, the rationality of the decision required by PAJA as part of the 
reasonableness requirement. This would enable taxpayers to know exactly 
what information the senior SARS official needs to base a rational decision 
on. Taxpayers do not know the type or extent of the information which is 
required for each factor, and furthermore, as the factors in section 164(3) of 
the TAA are considered to be not exhaustive (an interpretation based on the 
terms "relevant factors, including…"),64 taxpayers also do not know what 
SARS considers as any other relevant factors in addition to the factors 
listed. As taxpayers may not know what could be considered to be relevant 
by the senior SARS official when exercising the discretion, it might be 
difficult for taxpayers to determine the exact scope of the request. 
Furthermore, requests in terms of section 164(2) or decisions in terms of 
section 164(3) of the TAA are not published by SARS and as such, 
taxpayers may not know of factors which had previously been considered 
relevant in other cases. SARS is not transparent in this respect, which poses 
the risk that the decision made may be arbitrary (in the sense of it being 
unpredictable or inconsistent) and irrational. 
Section 6(2)(f)(ii)(bb) also provides for a ground of review if the action is not 
rationally connected to the purpose of the empowering provision (i.e. the 
purpose of section 164(3) of the TAA, which empowers the senior SARS 
official to make a decision on a suspension request). This implies that an 
understanding of the purpose of specific legislative provisions is important 
when a discretion is exercised by SARS officials. It is submitted that the 
purpose of section 164(3) of the TAA is to provide relief to taxpayers who 
are subject to the "pay now, argue later" rule of section 164(1) of the TAA 
in circumstances where such relief is warranted. For the decision on a 
suspension request to be rationally connected to this purpose, the grounds 
of section 164(5) of the TAA upon which a senior SARS official may deny a 
suspension request or revoke a decision to suspend payment become 
relevant. A decision to deny a suspension request if, for example, the 
objection or appeal is not frivolous or vexatious and if the taxpayer is not 
employing dilatory tactics in conducting the objection or appeal (section 
164(5)(a) and (b) of the TAA) may arguably be irrational, based on the 
purpose of section 164(3) of the TAA. 
                                            
63  PwC South Africa 2015 http://www.thesait.org.za/news/216884/Tax-Administration-
Laws-Amendment-Bill-B14-of-2014-will-effect-amendments-to-the-TAA-.htm 4. 
64  PwC South Africa 2015 http://www.thesait.org.za/news/216884/Tax-Administration-
Laws-Amendment-Bill-B14-of-2014-will-effect-amendments-to-the-TAA-.htm 4; 
Silke et al Silke on Tax Administration 5.9. 
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In Nieuwoudt v Chairman, Amnesty Subcommittee, Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission65 it was determined that in terms of the 
Constitution only a rational connection with minimal justification is required 
by the organ of state or administrator to overcome the rationality grounds 
for review, rather than the court’s having to replace the decision because it 
is essentially incorrect. Erasmus66 also believes that in practice the absence 
of a rational connection might be difficult for taxpayers to prove and as such, 
section 6(2)(f)(ii) may not be the most effective ground for the review of a 
section 164(3)-decision. 
5.2.2  Proportionality 
According to Woof et al,67 proportionality refers to whether manifestly 
disproportionate weight has been allocated to one or other consideration, 
relevant to the decision. Proportionality may also be defined as "the notion 
that one ought not to use a sledgehammer to crack a nut".68 Erasmus69 
states that proportionality means that the decision must be in proportion to 
the facts and circumstances of the case. Hoexter70 states that 
proportionality's essential elements are balance and necessity, together 
with suitability.  
A decision taken in terms of section 164(3) of the TAA must be proportional 
to the facts and circumstances of the case.71 For a proportional decision in 
terms of section 164(3) of the TAA, there should be a balance between the 
facts and the decision, and the need for the request should be considered 
together with the appropriateness thereof.72 This again confirms that the 
discretion exercised for each suspension request will be on a case-by-case 
basis.  
It is submitted that proportionality requires that the senior SARS official 
takes other powers which are available to SARS into account. SARS might 
have other (less drastic or more proportional) powers available to secure 
the payment of disputed tax, which may result in the denial of the 
suspension request being disproportional. If a taxpayer appears to be 
entitled to a suspension, there may still be some risk to accepting the 
request, but denying the request would be disproportionate. The question is 
                                            
65  Nieuwoudt v Chairman, Amnesty Subcommittee, Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission 2002 3 SA 143 (C) 164G. 
66  Erasmus Commissioner's Discretionary Powers 92. 
67  Woof et al De Smith's Judicial Review Glossary. 
68  S v Manamela 2000 3 SA 1 (CC) para 34. 
69  Erasmus Commissioner's Discretionary Powers 93. 
70  Hoexter Administrative Law 344. 
71  Erasmus Commissioner's Discretionary Powers 93. 
72  Hoexter Administrative Law 344. 
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then whether SARS has any other powers available that are more 
proportionate, rather than denying a suspension request. For example, if 
there is information giving reason to believe that a taxpayer might flee from 
the country but on all other grounds a suspension request should be 
accepted, SARS could consider bringing an application to court for an order 
that the taxpayer should surrender his or her passport.  
If the exercise of the discretion is not proportional, the decision will be 
reviewable in terms of section 6(2)(h) of PAJA, which requires that the 
power exercised was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could 
have so exercised the power. The reasonableness or otherwise of the 
senior SARS official's decision will be significantly influenced by the factors 
in section 164(3) of the TAA. If any of the factors are not considered by the 
senior SARS official, or if the factors are not equally considered by the 
senior SARS official, the decision could be reviewed in terms of section 
6(2)(h) of PAJA. 
5.3 Procedurally fair administrative action 
Section 3 of PAJA specifically provides a detailed approach to be followed 
in fulfilling the right to procedurally fair administrative action. Section 3(1) of 
PAJA provides that "administrative action which materially and adversely 
affects the rights or legitimate expectations of any person must be 
procedurally fair" and section 3(2)(a) of PAJA provides that "a fair 
administrative procedure depends on the circumstances of each case". 
PAJA distinguishes between compulsory and discretionary elements of 
procedural fairness. It may be noted that the compulsory elements are still 
subject to the flexibility provided for in section 3(2)(a) of PAJA, in other 
words, depending on the circumstances of each case.73 Other exceptions 
are allowed for in terms of section 3(4) of PAJA, where, if it is reasonable 
and justifiable to depart from the requirements in section 3(2) of PAJA, the 
departure will be acceptable. Section 3(5) of PAJA also allows the use of 
"fair but different" procedures as an alternative to the provisions in section 
3(2) of PAJA. 
The compulsory elements in terms of section 3(2)(b) of PAJA are that the 
administrator must give the taxpayer adequate notice of the nature and 
purpose of the proposed administrative action, a reasonable opportunity to 
make representations, a clear statement of the administrative action, 
adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal, where applicable, 
and adequate notice of the right to request reasons in terms of section 5 of  
PAJA. The discretionary elements are provided for in section 3(3) of PAJA 
                                            
73  Quinot Administrative Justice 154 with reference to Joseph v City of Johannesburg 
2010 4 SA 55 (CC). 
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and include that the administrator may give the taxpayer an opportunity to 
obtain assistance and in seriously complicated cases legal representation, 
to present and dispute information and arguments, and to appear in person.  
Some of the aforementioned elements of procedural fairness which are 
particularly relevant are subsequently applied in the context of section 
164(3) of the TAA. 
Regarding the first compulsory element of procedural fairness, it is 
submitted that no notice of the nature and purpose of the proposed 
administrative action is required by the senior SARS official, as it is the 
taxpayer who makes the request and who is therefore deemed to be aware 
of the nature and purpose of the proposed administrative action. As stated 
above, compulsory elements are subject to the flexibility provided for in 
section 3(2)(a) of PAJA or can be departed from where it is reasonable and 
justifiable in terms of section 3(4) of PAJA. 
The second compulsory requirement is that the administrator must provide 
a reasonable chance to make representations. In the context of section 
164(3) of the TAA, a taxpayer is given a reasonable chance to make 
representations by submitting all relevant information to SARS when the 
suspension request is made. This gives the taxpayer a way of participating 
in the decision to be made by the senior SARS official in the form of audi 
alterem partem. Hoexter74 states that through the audi alteram partem 
principle the taxpayer is given both the opportunity to participate in decisions 
that will affect his or her rights adversely and a chance to influence the 
outcome of those decisions to ensure procedural fairness. The taxpayer 
cannot interactively participate in the decision taken, as the taxpayer only 
submits the request and the senior SARS official then has the authority to 
accept or deny the request. The only possible manner in which the taxpayer 
could be heard or could influence the decision of the senior SARS official is 
by ensuring that all relevant documentation pertaining to the suspension is 
included in the request. It is submitted that the senior SARS official, if unable 
to make a just decision on the information before him or her, should grant 
the taxpayer an opportunity to appear in person, for example, to clarify any 
uncertainties, which is one of the discretionary elements of procedural 
fairness.  
Thirdly, a clear statement of the administrative action must be given by the 
senior SARS official. According to Hoexter, this would entitle the affected 
person (the taxpayer who made the suspension request) to know what was 
decided (whether the request was accepted or denied), when the decision 
was made, by whom the decision was made (in this regard, it is submitted 
                                            
74  Hoexter Administrative Law 363. 
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that it should be stated that the decision-maker is a designated senior SARS 
official, as this would also partially satisfy the lawfulness requirement as 
explained in paragraph 5.1.1 above) and the legal and factual basis on 
which the decision was made.75 The legal basis would be section 164(3) of 
the TAA. It is submitted that the factual basis on which the decision was 
made should originate from the taxpayer's suspension request, which 
contains the information presented by the taxpayer to the senior SARS 
official. The "clear statement of the administrative action" which must be 
provided will accordingly assist the taxpayer to evaluate the reasonableness 
of the decision, which requires that there must be a rational connection 
between the information, the decision and the reason for the decision. Even 
though it is not required for the senior SARS official to provide reasons as 
part of the clear statement, it should provide the taxpayer with some 
explanation because the factual basis on which the decision was made must 
be provided.  
With the aim of decreasing the possibility of procedurally unfair 
administrative action, the taxpayer needs to ensure that all relevant 
documentation is included when the suspension request is submitted. 
However, if the taxpayer is affected by procedurally unfair administrative 
action, he or she will be entitled to launch a review application in terms of 
section 6(2)(c) of  PAJA, based on the action being procedurally unfair.  
The rule against bias is also regarded as part of procedural fairness,76 and 
requires that the decision-maker must be impartial.77 For a fair decision in 
terms of section 164(3), the senior SARS official must not be biased or 
reasonably suspected of bias. In case of bias or a reasonable suspicion of 
bias, the taxpayer can make use of section 6(2)(a)(iii) of PAJA for review. A 
more detailed discussion of bias falls beyond the scope of this article. 
Suffice it to say that financial bias will exist should the senior SARS official 
who makes the decision on the suspension request earn an incentive bonus 
based on the amount of tax collected. 
6 Conclusion 
This article analyses the impact of the right to just administrative action on 
the manner in which the decision is made in terms of section 164(3) of the 
TAA.  
                                            
75  Hoexter Administrative Law 376. According to Quinot Administrative Justice 156, the 
same must be set out in the clear statement of the administrative action, namely 
"what was decided, who the decision-makers were, and on what legal and factual 
basis the decision was made". 
76  Hoexter Administrative Law 451; Quinot Administrative Justice 166. 
77  Hoexter Administrative Law 451. 
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Essentially, as the decision in terms of section 164(3) of the TAA constitutes 
administrative action, the decision must be taken in a lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair manner to ensure compliance with the Constitution and 
PAJA. For the decision to be taken in a lawful manner, the senior SARS 
official must at least be authorised to exercise the discretion in terms of the 
TAA and comply with the procedures and conditions stated in section 164(3) 
of the TAA, the main requirement of which is to ensure the consideration of 
relevant factors, including the factors listed. For the decision to be 
considered reasonable, the decision must be, at the minimum, rational (i.e. 
one must at least be able to justify the decision based on the information 
known to the decision-maker and the reasons supplied for that decision) 
and proportional (i.e. the decision taken in terms of section 164(3) of the 
TAA must be proportional to the facts and circumstances of the case, and 
other less drastic or more proportional powers available to secure the 
payment of disputed tax should have been considered by the senior SARS 
official). To ensure that the decision is taken procedurally fair, SARS should 
comply with at least the relevant compulsory elements in terms of section 
3(2)(b) of PAJA. A decision in terms of section 164(3) of the TAA which fails 
to meet the requirements of lawfulness, reasonableness and/or procedural 
fairness will be subject to review on several grounds listed in section 6(2) of 
PAJA. 
The impact of the right to just administrative action on the decision taken in 
terms of section 164(3) of the TAA required investigation from the viewpoint 
of taxpayers and from the viewpoint of SARS. The contribution of this study 
is broadening the taxpayers' knowledge of suspension requests, the right to 
just administrative action in the context of suspension requests, and the 
specific remedies available in PAJA in the case of non-compliance by 
SARS. Recommendations are suggested which SARS can consider 
implementing to ensure compliance with its constitutional obligations in 
respect of the right to just administrative action and to avoid reviews in terms 
of PAJA. Further, in a broader context, the study can be generally useful in 
the numerous other instances where SARS obtains discretionary powers in 
tax legislation. It is submitted that this research is relevant with regard to the 
practical protection of taxpayer rights as well and more generally to an 
understanding of the impact of South African constitutional law in the area 
of tax administration.  
It is recommended that SARS should issue guidelines to taxpayers on the 
process followed and the factors taken into account when considering a 
suspension request, and how the constitutional obligations of SARS in 
respect of the right to just administrative action are complied with. This could 
be in the form of a guide or an interpretation note, but it is essential that 
there be transparency around SARS' practice of considering suspension 
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requests, to ensure that the right of taxpayers to just administrative action 
is upheld. The implementation of administrative law in institutions such as 
SARS is vital to improving governance. The crucial pre-condition is, 
however, the education of administrators in the standards of law which they 
need to comply with. Essentially, the senior SARS official must act neutrally, 
ensure careful consideration of the factors in play, and not abuse this 
discretionary power. Also, the decision must be justifiable with reference to 
the information available to and reasons given by the senior SARS official, 
and correspond with the facts and circumstances of each request. 
A guide or interpretation note should also address the problem of 
information asymmetry which currently exists. The fact that a taxpayer does 
not know what the senior SARS official may consider to be relevant when 
the suspension request is considered is problematic in terms of the 
requirements of just administrative action. The criteria according to which 
the senior SARS official will exercise the discretion must be known for the 
taxpayer to submit the suspension request containing the relevant 
information. At present, without such guidelines or criteria, there is a risk of 
the outcome being unjust, or at least appearing to be unjust. 
To date, there has been no reported judgment regarding a suspension 
request. It has been stated that speculative inferences can be drawn from 
this fact.78 One reason for this might be that SARS did not want to take the 
risk of a pro-taxpayer judgment, as this could increase the number of 
suspension requests.79 However, this should not prevent a taxpayer from 
submitting a suspension request, and if necessary, from bringing an 
application for the review of the decision in terms of PAJA. When making a 
suspension request, the taxpayer needs to ensure that all relevant 
information is included and that the request is complete. As a taxpayer has 
no right of appeal when a suspension request is denied, the request will 
form the foundation of a review application in terms of PAJA. Hence, the 
taxpayer's formulation of the request could have a significant impact on the 
success of any subsequent review application. 
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